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A b s t r a c t .  T he classic readers-w riters problem  has been extensively s tu d ­
ied. T his holds to  a lesser degree for the  reen tran t version, where it is 
allowed to  nest locking actions. Such nesting is useful when a library  
is created  w ith  various procedures th a t each s ta r t  and end w ith  a lock. 
Allowing nesting makes it possible for these procedures to  call each other.
We considered an  existing widely used industria l im plem entation  of the 
reen tran t readers-w riters problem . We m odeled it using a m odel checker 
revealing a serious error: a possible deadlock situation . T he m odel was 
improved and checked satisfactorily  for a fixed num ber of processes. To 
achieve a correctness result for an  arb itra ry  num ber of processes the 
m odel was converted to  a theorem  prover w ith  which it was proven.
1 In trod u ction
It is generally acknowledged that the growth in processor speed is reaching a hard 
physical limitation. This has led to a revival of interest in concurrent processing. 
Also in industrial software, concurrency is increasingly used to improve efficiency
[26]. It is notoriously hard to write correct concurrent software. Finding bugs 
in concurrent software and proving the correctness of (parts o f) this software is 
therefore attracting more and more attention, in particular where the software 
is in the core of safety critical or industrial critical applications.
However, it can be incredibly difficult to  track concurrent software bugs down. 
In concurrent software bugs typically are caused by infrequent 'race conditions' 
that are hard to reproduce. In such cases, it is necessary to thoroughly investigate 
‘suspicious’ parts of the system  in order to improve these components in such a 
way that correctness is guaranteed.
Two commonly used techniques for checking correctness of such system are 
form al verification  and testing. In practice, testing is widely and successfully 
used to discover faulty behavior, but it cannot assure the absence of bugs. In 
particular, for concurrent software testing is less suited due to the typical char­
acteristics of the bugs (infrequent and hard to reproduce). There are roughly two 
approaches to formal verification: model checking and theorem proving. Model 
checking [6, 23] has the advantage that it can be performed automatically, pro­
vided that a suitable model of the software (or hardware) component has been 
created. Furthermore, in the case a bug is found model checking yields a coun­
terexample scenario. A drawback of model checking is that it suffers from the
state-space explosion and typically requires a closed system. In principle, theo­
rem proving can handle any system. However, creating a proof may be hard and 
it generally requires a large investment of time. It is only partially automated 
and mainly driven by the user’s understanding of the system. Besides, when 
theorem proving fails this does not necessarily imply that a bug is present. It 
may also be that the proof could not be found by the user.
In this paper we consider the reentrant readers-writers problem as a formal 
verification case study. The classic readers-writers problem [8] considers multiple 
processes that want to have read and/or write access to a common resource (a 
global variable or a shared object). The problem is to set up an access protocol 
such that no two writers are writing at the same time and no reader is accessing 
the common resource while a writer is accessing it. The classic problem is stud­
ied extensively[22]; the reentrant variant (in which locking can be nested) has 
received less attention so far although it is used in Java, C #  and C + +  libraries.
We have chosen a widely used industrial library (Trolltech’s Qt) that provides 
methods for reentrant readers-writers. For this library a serious bug is revealed 
and removed. This case study is performed in a structured manner combining 
the use of a model checker with the use of a theorem prover exploiting the 
advantages of these methods and avoiding their weaknesses.
In Section 2 we will introduce the case study. Its model will be defined, 
improved and checked for a fixed number of processes in Section 3. Using a 
theorem prover the model will be fully verified in Section 4. Finally, related 
work, future work and concluding remarks are found in Sections 5 and 6.
2 T h e readers-w riters problem
If in a concurrent setting two threads are working on the same resource, syn­
chronization of operations is often necessary to avoid errors. A test-and-set op­
eration is an important primitive for protecting common resources. This atomic 
(i.e. non-interruptible) instruction is used to both test and (conditionally) write 
to a memory location. To ensure that only one thread is able to access a resource 
at a given time, these processes usually share a global boolean variable that is 
controlled via test-and-set operations, and if a process is currently performing 
a test-and-set, it is guaranteed that no other process may begin another test- 
and-set until the first process is done. This primitive operation can be used to 
implement locks. A lock has two operations: lock and unlock. The lock operation 
is done before the critical section is entered, and the unlock operation is per­
formed after the critical section is left. The most basic lock can only be locked 
one time by a given thread. However, for more sophisticated solutions, just an 
atomic test-and-set operation is insufficient. This will require support of the un­
derlying OS: threads acquiring a lock already occupied by some thread should 
be de-scheduled until the lock is released. A variant of this way of locking is 
called condition locking : a thread can wait until a certain condition is satisfied, 
and will automatically continue when notified (signalled) that the condition has 
been changed. An extension for both basic and condition locking is reentrancy,
i.e. allowing nested lock operations by the same thread.
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A so-called read-write lock functions differently from a normal lock: it either 
allows multiple threads to access the resource in a read-only way, or it allows 
one, and only one, thread at any given time to have full access (both read 
and write) to the resource ([10]). These locks are the standard solution to the 
producer/consumer problem in which a buffer has to be shared.
Several kinds of solutions to the classical readers-writers problem exist. Here, 
we will consider a read-write locking mechanism with the following properties.
w r iters  p re feren ce  Read-write locks suffer from two kinds of starvation, one 
with each kind of lock operation. Write lock priority results in the possibility 
of reader starvation: when constantly there is a thread waiting to acquire a 
write lock, threads waiting for a read lock will never be able to proceed. Most 
solutions give priority to write locks over read locks because write locks are 
assumed to be more important, smaller, exclusive, and to occur less. 
reen tra n t A thread can acquire the lock multiple times, even when the thread 
has not fully released the lock. Note that this property is important for mod­
ular programming: a function holding a lock can use other functions which 
possibly acquire the same lock. We distinguish two variants of reentrancy:
1. Weakly reentrant : only permit sequences of either read or write locks;
2. Strongly reentrant : permit a thread holding a write lock to acquire a read 
lock. This will allow the following sequence of lock operations: writeJock, 
readJock, unlock, unlock. Note that the same function is called to unlock 
both a write lock and a read lock. The sequence of a read lock followed by 
a write lock is not admitted because of the evident risk of a deadlock (e.g. 
when two threads both want to perform the locking sequence readJock, 
write Jock they can both read but none of them can write).
2 .1  Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  R ea d -W rite  locks
In this section we show the C + +  implementation of weakly reentrant read/write 
locks being part of the multi-threading library of the Qt development framework, 
version 4.3. The code is not complete; parts that are not relevant to this presen­
tation are omitted. This implementation uses other parts of the library: threads, 
mutexes and conditions. Like e.g. in Java, a c o n d it io n  object allows a thread 
that owns the lock but that cannot proceed, to wait until some condition is sat­
isfied. When a running thread completes a task and determines that a waiting 
thread can now continue, it can call a signal on the corresponding condition. 
This mechanism is used in the C + +  code listed in Figure 1.
The structure QReadW riteLockPrivate contains the attributes of the class. 
These attributes are accessible via an indirection named d. The attributes mutex, 
readerW ait and w riterW ait are used to synchronize access to the other admin­
istrative attributes, of which accessC ount keeps track of the number of locks (in­
cluding reentrant locks) acquired for this lock. A negative value is used for write 
access and a positive value for read access. The attributes w aitingR eaders and 
w a itin gW riters indicate the number of threads requesting a read respectively 
write permission, that are currently pending. If some thread owns the write lock,
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s t r u c t  Q ReadW riteLockPrivate 
{
Q R eadW riteL ockPrivate()
: accessC o un t(O ), 
c u r re n tW rite r (O ) , 
w a itin g R ead ers(O ), 
w a itin g W rite rs (O )
{ }
QMutex mutex;
Q W aitC ondition re a d e rW a it, 
w rite rW a it;
Qt::HANDLE c u r re n tW rite r ;  
i n t  a c c e ssC o u n t,w a itin g R e a d e rs , 
w a it in g W rite rs ;
};
Qt::HANDLE s e l f  =
Q T h re a d ::c u rre n tT h re a d Id () ;  
w h ile  (d -> accessC ount != 0) { 
i f  (d -> accessC oun t < 0 &&
s e l f  == d -> c u rre n tW rite r )  { 
b re a k ; / /  r e c u r s iv e  w r i te  lo c k
}
+ + d -> w aitin g W rite rs ;
d -> w rite rW ait.w a it(& d -> m u tex );
—d -> w a itin g W rite rs ;
}
d -> c u rre n tW rite r  = s e l f ;
—d -> accessC oun t; 
Q_ASSERT_X(d->accessCount<0,
” ” ” ”)*
}
v o id  Q R eadW riteL ock::lockForR ead()
{
QMutexLocker lock(& d->m utex); 
w h ile  (d -> accessC oun t < 0 | |  
d -> w a itin g W rite rs )  { 
+ + d-> w aitingR eaders; 
d -> reade rW ait.w a it(& d-> m utex ); 
—d -> w aitin g R ead ers ;
}
++d->accessC ount;
Q_ASSERT_X(d->accessCount>0,
” ” ” ”)*
}
v o id  Q R eadW riteL ock ::lockForW rite() 
{
QMutexLocker lock(& d->m utex);
v o id  Q R eadW riteL ock::un lock()
{
QMutexLocker lock(& d->m utex); 
Q_ASSERT_X(d->accessCount!=0,
” ” ” ”)* 
i f  ((d -> accessC ou n t > 0 &&
—d -> accessC oun t = = 0 )  | |  
(d -> accessC oun t < 0 &&
++d->accessC ount = = 0 ) )  { 
d -> c u rre n tW rite r  = 0; 
i f  (d -> w a itin g W rite rs )  { 
d -> w rite rW ait.w akeO ne();
} e l s e  i f  (d -> w a itin g R e ad e rs) { 
d -> re a d e rW a it.w a k e A ll() ;
}
}
}
F ig . 1. QReadWriteLock class of Q t
currentW riter contains a HANDLE to this thread; otherwise currentW riter is 
a null pointer.
The code itself is fairly straightforward. The locking of the mutex is done 
via the constructor of the wrapper class QMutexLocker. Unlocking this mutex 
happens implicitly in the destructor of this wrapper. Observe that a write lock 
can only be obtained when the lock is completely released (d->accessC ount 
== 0), or the thread already has obtained a write lock (a reentrant write lock 
request, d -> currentW riter == s e l f ) .
The code could be polished a bit. E.g. one of the administrative attributes 
can be expressed in terms of the others. However, we have chosen not to deviate 
from the original code, except for the messages in the assertions which were, of 
course, more informative.
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3 M od el checking rea d ers/w r iters  w ith  U ppaal
Uppaal [17] is a tool for modeling and verification of real-time systems. The 
idea is to model a system using timed automata. Timed automata are finite 
state machines with time. A system consists of a collection of such automata. 
An automaton is composed of locations and transitions between these locations 
defining how the system behaves. To control when to fire a transition one can 
use guarded transitions and synchronized transitions. Guards are just boolean 
expressions whereas the synchronization mechanism is based on hand-shakes: 
two processes (automata) can take a simultaneous transition, if one does a send, 
ch !, and the other a receive, ch?, on the same channel ch. For administration 
purposes, but also for communication between processes, one can use global 
variables. Moreover, each process can have its own local variables. Assignments 
to local or global variables can be attached to transitions as so-called updates.
In this paper we will not make use of time. In Uppaal terminology: we don’t 
have c lo c k  variables. Despite the absence of this most distinctive feature of 
Uppaal, we have still chosen to use Uppaal here because of our local expertise and 
the intuitive and easy to use graphical interface which supports understanding 
and improving the model in a elegant way. The choice of model checker is however 
not essential for the case study. It could also have been performed with any other 
model checker such as e.g. SMV [19], mCRL2 [11] or SPIN [14].
C o n str u c tin g  th e  U p p a a l m o d e l
Our intention is to model the code from Figure 1 as an abstract Uppaal model, 
preferably in a way that the distance between code and model is kept as small 
as possible. However, instead of trying to model Qt-threads in Uppaal we will 
directly use the built-in Uppaal processes to represent these threads. Thread 
handles are made explicit by numbering the processes, and using these numbers 
as identifications. NT is the total number of processes. The identification numbers 
are denoted by t i d  in the model, ranging 0 to NT - 1. The NT value is also used 
to represent the null pointer for the variable currentW riter in the C + +  code. 
Mutexes and conditions directly depend on the thread implementation, so we 
cannot model these objects by means of code abstraction. Instead we created an 
abstract model in Uppaal that essentially simulates the behavior of these objects. 
The result is shown in Figure 2. In this basic locking model, method calls are 
simulated via synchronization messages. The conditions are represented by two 
integer variables, s leep in gR ead ers and sleep in g W riter s , that maintain the 
number of waiting readers and waiting writers, respectively. A running process 
can signal such a process which will result in a wake up message. A process 
receiving such a message should always immediately try to acquire the lock, 
otherwise mutual exclusion is not guaranteed anymore.
The RWLock implementation is model checked using the combination of this 
basic locking process with a collection of concurrent processes, each continuously 
performing either a lockForRead, lockForW rite, or un lock  step. The abstract 
model (see Figure 3) is obtained basically by translating C + +  statem ents into 
transitions.
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F ig . 2. M utex  and condition m odel
For convenience of comparison, we have split the model into three parts, cor­
responding to lockForRead, w riteL ock and unlock  respectively. These parts 
can be easily combined into a single model by collapsing the S ta r t  states, 
and, but not necessarily, the Abort states. The auxiliary functions testR Lock, 
testWLock, and testReentrantW Lock are defined as:
boo l tes tR L o ck (T h read Id  t i d )
{ r e tu r n  w a itin g W rite rs> 0  | |(c u r re n tW rite r != N T  && c u r r e n tW r i te r ! = t id ) ;}
boo l testW Lock (T hreadId  t i d )  b oo l testR eentran tW L ock  (T hreadId  t i d )
{ r e tu r n  accessC oun t != 0 && { r e tu r n  accessC oun t != 0 &&
c u r re n tW rite r  != t i d ;  t i d  == c u r re n tW rite r ;
} }
If a process perform s a lock operation  it will enter a location  th a t  is labeled w ith 
EnterXX. Here, XX corresponds to  the  called operation. T he call is left via a LeaveXX lo­
cation. For exam ple, if a  th read  invokes lockForR ead it will enter th e  location  EnterRL. 
H ereafter, the  possible s ta te  transitions directly  reflect th e  corresponding flow of control 
in the  original code for th is m ethod. T he call ends a t LeaveRL. These special locations 
are introduced to  have a kind of separation  betw een definition and usage of m ethods. 
If the  th read  was suspended (due to  a call to  the  w a it m ethod  on the  read erW ait 
condition) th e  process in  the  ab strac t m odel will be w aiting in  the  location  RWait. 
T he w rapper QMutexLocker has been replaced by a call to  lock . To take the  effect of 
the  destruc to r into account, we added a call to  unlock a t the  end of the  scope of the 
w rapper object. Furtherm ore, observe th a t  assertions are m odeled as a ‘black hole’: a 
s ta te , labeled A bort, from which there is no escape possible.
C h eck in g  th e  m o d e l
T he m ain  purpose of a m odel checker is to  verify the  m odel w .r.t. a requirem ent 
specification. In  U ppaal, requirem ents are specified as queries consisting of p a th  and 
s ta te  formulae. T he la tte r  describe individual s ta tes whereas the  form er range over 
execution p a th s or traces of the  model. In  U ppaal, the  (state) form ula A[] p  expresses 
th a t  p  should be true  in all reachable states. d ead lo ck  is a built-in  form ula which is 
true  if the  s ta te  has no outgoing edges.
In  our exam ple we w ant to  verify th a t the  m odel is deadlock-free, which is a sta te  
property. T his can easily be expressed by m eans of the  following query:
A [] n o t  d e a d lo c k
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F ig . 3. U ppaal m odels of the  locking prim itives
W hen running U ppaal on th is m odel consisting of 2 th reads, the  verifier will alm ost 
instan tly  respond with: P ro p e r ty  i s  n o t s a t i s f i e d .  T he trace generated  by U ppaal 
shows a counter exam ple of th e  property, in th is case a scenario leading to  a deadlock. 
T he problem  is th a t if a th read , which is already holding a read lock, does a (reen trant) 
request for another read  lock, it will be suspended if another th read  is pending for a 
w rite lock (which is the  case if the  w rite lock was requested  after th e  first th read  
obtained th e  lock for th e  first tim e). Now b o th  th reads are w aiting for each other.
3.1  C o rrectin g  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n /m o d e l
T he solution is to  let a reen tran t lock a ttem p t always succeed. To avoid w riters s ta rva­
tion, new read lock requests should be accepted only if there are no w riters w aiting for 
the  lock. To distinguish non-reentran t and reen tran t uses, we m ain tain , per th read , the 
current num ber of nested  locks m aking no d istinction  betw een read  and w rite locks. 
Additionally, th is solution allows strongly reen tran t use. In  th e  im plem entation  th is is 
achieved by adding a hash map  (nam ed c u r r e n t  of type QHash) to  the  a ttr ib u tes  of 
the  class th a t  m aps each th read  handle to  a counter. To illustra te  our adjustm ents, we 
show the  im plem entation  of lockForR ead 1.
1 For the  com plete code, see w w w .cs .ru .n l/~ sjak ie /p ap ers /read ersw rite rs /.
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v o id  Q R eadW riteL ock::lockForR ead() {
QMutexLocker lock(& d->m utex);
Qt::HANDLE s e l f  = Q T h re a d ::c u rre n tT h re a d Id () ;
QHash<Qt::HANDLE, i n t > : : i t e r a t o r  i t  = d - > c u r r e n t . f i n d ( s e l f ) ;  
i f  ( i t  != d -> c u r r e n t .e n d ( ) )  {
+ + i t .v a lu e ( ) ;
Q_ASSERT_X(d->numberOfThreads > 0 , " . . . " ,  " . . . " ) ;  
r e tu r n ;
}
w h ile  (d -> c u rre n tW rite r  != 0 | |  d -> w a itin g W rite rs  > 0) { 
+ + d-> w aitingR eaders; 
d -> reade rW ait.w a it(& d-> m utex );
— d -> w aitin g R ead ers ;
}
d - > c u r r e n t . i n s e r t ( s e l f ,  1 );
++d->numberOfThreads;
Q_ASSERT_X(d->numberOfThreads> 0 , " . . . " ,  " . . . " ) ;
}
To verify th is im plem entation  we again converted th e  code to  U ppaal. Since handles 
where represented by integers ranging from 0 to  NT -  1 (where NT denotes the  num ber 
of th re ad s), we can use a simple integer array  to  m ain tain  th e  num ber of nested  locks per 
th read , instead  of a hash  m ap. In  this array, the  process id is used as an index. Figure 
4 shows th e  p a rt of th e  U ppaal m odel th a t corresponds to  the  im proved lockForR ead. 
For th e  full U ppaal model, see w w w .cs .ru .n l/~ sjak ie /p ap ers /read ersw rite rs /.
BeginRL ReaH io c k currentWriter != NT || r W ... •currentrtidi == 0 ReaHLock writersWaiting > 0 RWait
readNest < 
maxNest
wakeupReader?
unlock!
LeaveRL numberOfThreads > 0 EnHRL
RBlockeH
F ig . 4. U ppaal m odel of th e  correct version of lockForR ead
To lim it th e  s ta te  space we have added an upper bound  maxNest to  th e  nesting 
level and a counter read N est indicating  th e  current nesting level. This variable is 
decrem ented in  the  unlock p a rt of the  full model. R unning U ppaal on the  improved 
m odel will, no t surprisingly, result in th e  message: P ro p e r ty  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  In this 
experim ent we have lim ited th e  num ber of processes to  4, and the  m axim um  num ber 
of reen tran t calls to  5. If we increase these values slightly, the  execution tim e worsens 
drastically. So, for a com plete correctness result, we have to  proceed differently.
EnterRL
4 G eneral reentrant readers-w riters m odel
In this section we will formalize the  U ppaal m odel in PVS [21].
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We prove th a t  the  reen tran t algorithm  is free from deadlock when we generalize to  any 
num ber of processes. W hile explaining the  form alization we will briefly introduce PVS. 
For the  com plete PVS specification, see w w w .cs .ru .n l/~ sjak ie /p ap ers /read ersw rite rs /.
4 .1  R ea d ers-W riters  m o d e l in  P V S
PVS offers an interactive environm ent for th e  developm ent and analysis of form al 
specifications. T he system  consists of a specification language and a theorem  prover. 
T he specification language of PVS is based on classic, typed  higher-order logic. It 
resembles com m on functional program m ing languages, such as Haskell, L ISP or ML. 
T he choice of PVS as th e  theorem  prover to  m odel th e  readers w riters locking algorithm  
is purely based upon  the presence of local expertise. T he proof can  be reconstructed  
in any reasonably m odern  theorem  prover, for instance Isabelle [20] or Coq[5]. There 
is no im plicit notion  of s ta te  in PVS specifications. So, we explicitly keep track  of a 
system  s ta te  th a t  basically consists of the  system  variables used in th e  U ppaal model.
In  the  U ppaal m odel a critical section s ta rts  w ith  a lo c k ! and ends w ith  either a 
u n lo c k ! , rea d e rsW a it!  or w r ite rsW a it!  synchronization. N ot all the  s ta te  transitions 
are m odelled individually in  the  PVS model. All actions occuring inside a critical section 
are m odeled as a single transition . This makes the  locking m echanism  pro tecting  the 
critical sections superfluous in the  PV S m odel and enables us to  reduce the  num ber of 
different locations. Only these locations in the  U ppaal m odel th a t  are outside a critical 
section are needed and are tracked by the  T hreadL ocation  variable. Furtherm ore, the 
EnterXX and LeaveXX locations are ignored, because they  are only used as a label for 
a function call and have no influence on the  behavior of the  m odeled processes.
W ith  NT denoting the  to ta l num ber of processes, we get the  following representation:
ThreadID : TYPE =  below(NT)2
T hreadL ocation  : TYPE =  { START, RWAIT, RBLOCKED, WWAIT, WBLOCKED } 
T hreadIn fo  : TYPE =  [# s t a tu s  : T h readL o ca tion , c u r re n t  : n a t  # ] 3
System : TYPE =  [# w a it in g W rite rs , w a itin g R e a d e rs ,
numberOfThreads : n a t ,
c u r re n tW rite r  : below(NT+1) ,
th re a d s  : ARRAY [ThreadID ^  T h rea d In fo ] # ]4
T he auxiliary variables read N est, w rite N e s t and maxNest restric t th e  U ppaal 
m odel to  a m axim um  num ber of nested  reads and writes. They also prevent unw anted 
sequences of lock/unlock operations, e.g. when a w rite lock request occurs after a read 
lock has already been obtained. In  th e  PVS m odel we allow for any am ount of nesting, 
so the  variables w rite N e s t and maxNest introduced  to  lim it nesting can be discarded. 
T he read N est variable is used to  check w hether there  already is a read lock present 
when a w rite lock is requested. In  th e  PVS m odel we have im plem ented th is check by 
testing  w hether th e  lock counter for th is particu lar th read  is 0 before it s ta r ts  waiting 
for a (non-reentrant) w rite lock. T he logic behind it is th a t  if, previously, a read  lock 
had been obtained  by th is th read , th e  counter would have been unequal to  0.
Because none of the  variable updates in the  U ppaal m odel occur outside of a critical 
section, we can  m odel th e  concurrent execution of the  different processes obtaining 
writelocks, readlocks and releasing them  by trea ting  them  as interleaved functions.
2 D enotes the  set of n a tu ra l num bers betw een 0 and NT, exclusive of NT.
3 R ecordtypes in  PV S are surrounded by [#  and #].
4 A rrays in  PVS are denoted  as functions.
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We first define a step  function th a t  executes one of th e  possible actions for a single 
process. T he step  function is restric ted  to  operate  on a subset of the  System d a ta  type, 
signified by th e  v a l id S ta te ?  predicate, fu rther explained in Section 4.3. T he actions 
them selves do no t deliver ju s t a new s ta te  b u t a lifted  sta te . In PVS, th e  predefined 
l i f t  d a ta typ e , consisting of two constructors up and bottom , adds a bo ttom  elem ent to  
a given base type, in our case v a l id S ta te ?  incorporating  the  s ta te  of the  model. This 
is useful for defining partia l functions, particu larly  to  indicate th e  cases th a t  certain  
actions are not perm itted .
In  essence the  step  function  corresponds to  th e  center of th e  U ppaal m odel consist­
ing of th e  S t a r t  and the  EnterXX/LeaveXX states.
s te p ( t id :T h re a d ID , s 1 , s2 : (v a l id S ta te ? )  ) :  boo l =
w r i te lo c k ( s 1 , t i d )  =  u p ( s 2 )V re a d lo c k ( s 1 , t i d )  =  u p (s2 ) V 
u n lo c k (s 1 , t i d )  =  up (s2 )
T he predicate in te r le a v e  sim ulates parallel execution of threads.
in te r le a v e  ( s 1 ,s2 :S y stem ): boo l =
3 ( t id :T h re a d ID ) : s t e p ( t i d ,s 1 , s2 )A
V (o th e r_ tid :  T hreadID ): o th e r _ t id  =  t i d  ^
s 1 ‘th re a d s (o th e r_ t id )  =  s 2 ‘th re a d s (o th e r_ t id )  5
4 .2  T ra n s la tio n  from  U p p a a l to  P V S
T he functions th a t  perform  the readlock, writelock and unlock respectively are essen­
tially  th e  sam e as in the  original code. I t is very well possible to  derive the  code au to ­
m atically  from the  U ppaal m odel by identifying all p a th s th a t s ta r t  w ith  a lo c k ! action 
on its  edge and lead to  th e  first edge w ith  an u n lo c k ! , rea d e rsW a it!  or w rite rsW a it!  
action. T he re a d lo c k  function is provided as an  exam ple of th is transla tion . For in­
stance, the  round trip  in Figure 4 from the S t a r t  location, th rough  BeginRL directly  
going to  EndRL, has guard  c u r r e n t [ t i d ]  > 0, and action  c u r r e n t [ t id ] + + ;  associ­
ated  w ith  it. I t s ta rts  and ends in  the  START location  of the  PVS model. T his can be 
recognized as a p a rt of th e  code of the  re a d lo c k  function  below.
r e a d lo c k ( s 1 : ( v a l id S ta te ? ) , tid :T h rea d ID ) : l i f t [ (v a l id S ta te ? )] =
LET th re a d  =  s 1 ‘t h r e a d s ( t id )  IN 
CASES th r e a d ‘s t a tu s  OF 
START:
IF th r e a d ‘c u rre n t  >  0
THEN up(s1  WITH [th re a d s  :=  s1 ‘ th re a d s  WITH
[t i d  :=  th re a d  WITH [c u r re n t  :=  th r e a d ‘cu rren t+ 1  ] ] ] )
ELSIF s 1 ‘c u rre n tW rite r  =  NT V s1 ‘ w a itin g W rite rs  >  0 
THEN up(s1  WITH [w aiting R ead ers :=  s1 ‘w aiting R ead ers + 1, 
th re a d s  :=  s1 ‘ th re a d s  WITH 
[t i d  :=  th re a d  WITH [s t a tu s  :=  RWAIT]] ] )
ELSE up(s1  WITH [ numberOfThreads :=  s1 ‘numberOfThreads + 1, 
th re a d s  :=  s1 ‘ th re a d s  WITH 
[t i d  :=  th re a d  WITH [c u r re n t  :=  1]]] )
ENDIF,
RBLOCKED:
5 T he ‘ operato r denotes record selection.
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IF s 1 ‘c u rren tW rite r  =  NT V s 1 ‘w aitin g W rite rs  >  0 
THEN up(s1)
ELSE up(s1  WITH [ numberOfThreads :=  s1 ‘numberOfThreads + 1, 
w aitingR eaders :=  s 1 ‘w aitingR eaders -  1, 
th re a d s  :=  s1 ‘ th re a d s  WITH
[t i d  :=  th re a d  WITH [c u rre n t :=  1, s ta tu s  :=  START]]]) 
ENDIF
ELSE:
up (s1)
ENDCASES
4.3 S y stem  in v a rian ts
Not every com bination of variables will be reached during norm al execution of the 
program. Auxiliary variables are m aintained th a t keep track of the to ta l am ount of 
processes th a t are in their critical section and of the num ber of processes th a t are 
waiting for a lock. We express the consistency of the values of those variables by using 
a v a l id S ta te ?  predicate. This is an invariant on the global sta te  of all the processes 
and essential in proving th a t the algorithm is deadlock free. We want to  express in this 
invariant th a t the global sta te  is sane and safe. Sanity is defined as:
— The value of the w aitingR eaders should be equal to  the to ta l num ber of processes 
w ith a sta tus of RWAIT or RBLOCKED.
— The value of the w aitin g W rite rs  should be equal to  the to ta l num ber of processes 
w ith a sta tus of WWAIT or WBLOCKED.
— The value of the numberOfThreads variable should be equal to  the number of pro­
cesses w ith a lock count of 1 or higher.
Besides the redundant variables having sane values, we also prove th a t the invariant 
satisfies th a t any waiting process has a count of zero current readlocks, stored in the 
c u rre n t field of ThreadInfo . Furtherm ore, if a process has obtained a write lock, then 
only th a t process can be in its critical section:
s : VAR System
co u n tIn v (s): bool =  s ‘numberOfThreads =  c o u n t(s ‘th re a d s)
w a itin g W rite rs In v (s ) : bool =  s ‘w aitin g W rite rs  =  w a itin g W rite rs (s )  
w a itin g R e ad e rsIn v (s) : bool =  s ‘w aitingR eaders =  w aitingR eaders(s)
s t a tu s I n v ( s ) : bool =  V (tid :T h read ID ):
LET th r  =  s ‘ th re a d s  ( t id )  IN
t h r ‘s ta tu s  =  WWAIT V t h r ‘s ta tu s  =  WBLOCKED V
t h r ‘s ta tu s  =  RWAIT V t h r ‘s ta tu s  =  RBLOCKED ^  t h r ‘c u rre n t =  0
w riteLockedByInv(s) : bool =  LET tw lb  =  s ‘c u rren tW rite r  IN 
tw lb =  NT ^  s ‘numberOfThreads =  1 A
s ‘th re a d s ( tw lb ) ‘s ta tu s  =  START A s ‘th r e a d s ( tw lb ) ‘c u rre n t >  0 A 
V (tid :T h read ID ): t i d  =  tw lb  ^  s ‘t h r e a d s ( t i d ) ‘c u r re n t =  0))
v a l id S ta te ? ( s )  : bool =  co u n tIn v (s)A  w a itin g W rite rsIn v (s)A
s ta tu s In v (s )A  w riteLockedB yInv(s)A  w aitingR eadersInv(s)
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Before trying to  prove the invariant w ith PVS, we have first tested  the above properties 
(except for w aitingW rite rsInv ) and w aitingR eadersInv) in the Uppaal model to  see 
if they hold in the fixed size model (see Figure 5). The properties w a itingW rite rsInv  
and w aitingR eadersInv  cannot be expressed in Uppaal because one cannot count the 
num ber of processes residing in a specific location. The inspection of the above prop­
erties in U ppaal enables us to  detect any mistakes in the invariant before spending 
precious tim e on trying to  prove them  in PVS.
— A []co u n tC u rren ts()  =  numberOfThreads (COUNT INV.) 6
— A[] Vt G T hreadId : Thread(t).W W ait V T hread(t).R W aitV  
T hread(t).W B locked V T hread(t).R B locked  ^  c u r r e n t[ t ]  =  0 (STATUS INV.)
— A []cu rre n tW rite r  =  NT ^  (w r it eLookedB y INV.)
numberOfThreads =  1 A
—T h re ad (cu rren tW rite r) .w riteL o ck E n d  ^  c u r re n t[c u r re n tW rite r ]  >  0 A 
Vt G ThreadId  : t  =  c u rre n tW rite r  ^  c u r r e n t[ t ]  =  0
F ig . 5. The invariants checked in Uppaal
The definition of the read lo ck  function over the dependent type v a l id S ta te ?  im­
plies th a t autom atically type checking conditions are generated. They oblige us to 
prove th a t, if we are in a valid state, the transition  to  another sta te  will yield a sta te 
for which the invariant still holds. The proof itself is a straightforward, albeit large 
(about 400 proof commands), case distinction w ith the help of some auxiliary lemmas.
4.4 N o d ead lo ck
The theorem-prover PVS does not have an innate notion of deadlock. If, however, we 
consider the sta te-transition  model as a directed graph, in which the edges are deter­
mined by the in te r le a v e  function, deadlock can be detected in this sta te  transition 
graph by identifying a sta te  for which there are no outgoing edges. This interpretation 
of deadlock can be too limited. If, for example, there is a situation where a process 
alters one of the sta te  variables in a non term inating loop, the sta te-transition  model 
will yield an infinite graph and a deadlock will not be detected, because each sta te 
has an outgoing edge. Still, all the other processes will not be able to  make progress. 
To obtain a more refined notion of deadlock, we define a well founded ordering on the 
system sta te  and show th a t for each sta te  reachable from the starting  sta te  (except 
for the starting  sta te  itself), there exists a transition  to  a smaller sta te  according to 
th a t ordering. The smallest element w ithin the order is the starting  state. This means 
th a t each reachable sta te  has a path  back to the starting  sta te  and consequently it is 
impossible for any process to  rem ain in a such a loop indefinitely. Moreover, this also 
covers the situation in which we would have a local deadlock (i.e. several but not all 
processes are waiting for each other).
t  : VAR ThreadInfo
s ta r t in g ?  : PRED[ T hreadInfo] =  { t  | t ‘s ta tu s  =  START A t ‘c u rre n t =  0}
s ta r t in g S ta te ( s :  ( v a l id S ta te ? ) ) :  bool =
V (tid :T h read ID ): s t a r t i n g ? ( s ‘th r e a d s ( t id ))
In the starting  sta te  all processes are running and there are no locks.
6 coun tC urren ts determ ines the num ber of threads having a c u r re n t greater th an  0.
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We create a well founded ordering by defining a sta te  to  become smaller if the num ­
ber of waiting processes decreases or alternatively, if the num ber of waiting processes 
remains the same and the to ta l count of the num ber of processes th a t have obtained a 
lock is decreasing. Well foundedness follows directly from the well foundedness of the 
lexicographical ordering on pairs of natural numbers.
s m a lle rS ta te ( s 2 , s1 : (v a lid S ta te ? ) )  : bool =  
numberW aiting(s2) <  numberW aiting(s1) V
numberW aiting(s2) =  num berW aiting(s1)A  
to ta lC o u n t(s2 )  <  to ta lC o u n t(s1 )
The numberWaiting function as well as the to ta lC o u n t function are recursive functions 
on the array w ith thread inform ation yielding the num ber of processes th a t have either 
a RBLOCKED, RWAIT, WBLOCKED or WWAIT status, and sum of all c u r re n t fields respectively.
Once we have established th a t each sta te  transition  m aintains the invariant, all we 
have to  prove is th a t each transition, except for the starting  sta te  will possibly result in 
a sta te  th a t is smaller. This is the noDeadlock theorem. Proving this theorem  is mainly 
a case distinction w ith a couple of inductive proofs thrown in for good measure. The 
induction is needed to  establish th a t the increase and decrease in the variables can only 
happen if certain  preconditions are met. The proof takes about 300 proof commands.
noDeadlock: THEOREM
V(s1: ( v a l id S ta te ? )) : —s ta r t in g S ta te ( s 1 )  ^
3 (s2 : (v a lid S ta te ? ) )  : in te r le a v e ( s 1 , s2 )A  s m a lle rS ta te ( s 2 , s1)
5 R elated  and future W ork
Several studies investigated either  the conversion of code to  sta te  transition  models, 
as is done e.g. in [28] w ith mcrl2  or  the transform ation of a sta te  transition  model 
specified in a model checker to  a sta te  transition  model specified in a theorem  prover, 
as is done e.g. in [16] using VeriTech. W ith  the tool TAME one can specify a time 
autom aton directly in the theorem  prover PVS [3]. For the purpose of developing 
consistent requirem ent specifications, the transform ation of specifications in Uppaal
[17] to  specifications in PVS has been studied in [9].
In [22] model checking and theorem  proving are combined to  analyze the classic 
(non-reentrant) R eaders/W riters problem. The authors do not s ta rt w ith actual source 
code bu t w ith a tabu lar specification th a t can be translated  straightforwardly into 
SPIN and PVS. Safety and clean completion properties are derived semi-automatically. 
Model checking is used to  validate potential invariants.
[13] reports on experiments in combing theorem  proving w ith model checking for 
verifying transition  systems. The complexity of systems is reduced abstracting out 
sources for unboundedness using theorem  proving, resulting in an bounded system 
suited for being model checked. One of the m ain difficulties is th a t formal proof tech­
niques are usually not scalable to  real sized systems w ithout an ex tra effort to  abstract 
the system manually to  a suitable model.
The verification framework SAL (See [25]) combines different analysis tools and 
techniques for analyzing transition  systems. Besides model checking and theorem  prov­
ing it provides program  slicing, abstraction and invariant generation.
In [12] p art of an aircraft control system is analyzed, using a theorem  prover. This 
experiment was previously performed on a single configuration w ith a model checker. A
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technique called feature-based decom position  is proposed to  determ ine inductive invari­
ants. It appears th a t this approach adm its increm ental extension of an initially simple 
base model making it better scalable th an  traditional techniques.
Java Pathfinder (JPF ) [29] operates directly on Java making a transform ation of 
source code superfluous. However, this tool works on a complete program, such th a t 
it is much more difficult to  create abstractions. The extension of JP F  w ith symbolic 
execution as discussed by [1 ] might be a solution to  this problem.
An alternative for JP F  is Bandera [7], which translates Java programs to  the input 
languages of SMV and SPIN. Like in JP F , it is difficult to  analyse separate pieces of 
code in Bandera. There is an interesting connection between Bandera and PVS. To 
express th a t properties do not depend on specific values, Bandera provides a dedicated 
language for specifying abstractions, i.e. concrete values are autom atically replaced by 
abstract values, thus reducing the sta te  space. The introduction of these abstract values 
may lead to  prove obligations which can be expressed and proven in PVS.
In [24] a model checking m ethod is given which uses an extension of JML [18] to 
check properties of m ulti-threaded Java programs.
W ith  Zing [2] on the one hand models can be created from source code and on the 
other hand executable versions of the transition  relation of a model can be generated 
from the model. This has been used successfully by Microsoft to  model check parts of 
their concurrency libraries.
F u tu re  w ork
The methodology used (creating in a structured  way a model close to the code, model 
checking it first and proving it afterwards) proved to  be very valuable. We found a 
bug, improved the code, extended the capabilities of the code and proved it correct. 
One can say th a t the model checker was used to  develop the formal model which was 
proven w ith the theorem  prover. This decreased significantly the tim e investment of 
the use of a theorem  prover to  enhance reliability. However, every model was created 
manually. We identified several opportunities for tool support and further research.
M o d e l checked  r e la te d  to  s o u rc e  co d e  Tool support could be helpful here: not 
only to  ’transla te ’ the code from the source language to  the model checker’s lan­
guage. It could also be used to  record the abstractions th a t are made. In this case 
th a t were: basic locks ^  lock process model, hash tables ^  arrays, threads ^  
processes and some nam e changes. A tool th a t recorded these abstractions, could 
assist in creating trusted  source code from the model checked model.
M o d e l checked  r e la te d  to  m o d e l p ro v e n  It would be interesting to  prove th a t 
the model in the theorem  prover is equivalent w ith the model checked. In terest­
ing m ethods to  do this would be using a semantic compiler, as was done in the 
European Robin project [27], or employing a specially designed formal library for 
models created w ith a model checker, like e.g. TAME [3].
M o d e l p ro v e n  r e la te d  to  s o u rc e  co d e  Another interesting future research option 
is to  investigate generating code from the fully proven model. This could be 
code generated from code-carrying theories [15] or it could be proof-carrying code 
through the use of refinement techniques [4].
6 C onclud ing rem arks
We have investigated Trolltech’s widely used industrial im plem entation of the reen­
tran t readers-writers problem. Model checking revealed an error in the im plementation.
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Trolltech was informed about the bug. Recently, Trolltech released a new version of the 
thread library (version 4.4) in which the error was repaired. However, the new version 
of the Q t library is still only weakly reentrant, not adm itting threads th a t have write 
access to  do a read lock. This lim itation unnecessarily ham pers m odular programming.
The improved Readers-W riters model described in this paper is deadlock free  and 
strongly reentrant. The model was first developed and checked for a limited num ber of 
processes using a model checker. Then, the properties were proven for any number of 
processes using a theorem  prover.
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